Resolving the puzzle of the underissuance of national bank notes by Charles W. Calomiris & Joseph R. Mason
 
 
WORKING PAPER NO. 05-19 
RESOLVING THE PUZZLE OF THE  
UNDERISSUANCE OF  NATIONAL BANK NOTES   
 
 
Charles W. Calomiris 
Columbia University 
and 
 Joseph R. Mason 
Drexel University 











RESOLVING THE PUZZLE OF THE UNDERISSUANCE OF  
NATIONAL BANK NOTES 
 














 The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the 
views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia or the Federal Reserve System. This 
paper is available free of charge at www.philadelphiafed.org/econ/wps/index.html. 
Calomiris is the Henry Kaufman Professor of Financial Institutions at Columbia 
University, a research associate of the NBER, and the Arthur Burns Fellow at the 
American Enterprise Institute. Mason is an Associate Professor of Finance at Drexel 
University and a Senior Fellow at the Wharton School. He is also a Visiting Scholar in the 









RESOLVING THE PUZZLE OF THE UNDERISSUANCE OF  
 






The puzzle of underissuance of national bank notes disappears when one disaggregates 
data, takes account of regulatory limits, and considers differences in opportunity costs.  
Banks with poor lending opportunities maximized their issuance. Other banks chose to 
limit issuance. Redemption costs do not explain cross-sectional variation in issuance, and 
the observed relationship between note issuance and excess reserves is inconsistent with 
the redemption risk hypothesis of underissuance. National banks did not enter primarily 
to issue national bank notes, and a “pure arbitrage” strategy of chartering a national bank 
only to issue national bank notes would not have been profitable. Indeed, new entrants 
issued less while banks exiting were often maximum issuers. Economies of scope 
between note issuing and deposit banking included shared overhead costs and the ability 
to reduce costs of mandatory minimum reserve and capital requirements.    3
 
I. Introduction 
During the Civil War, the federal government began to charter national banks.  
These banks enjoyed the privilege of being licensed to issue national bank notes, which 
were default-risk-free liabilities of the banks, backed 111% by U.S. Treasury bonds 
deposited by issuing banks at the U.S. Treasury.
1 The creation of these new banks, 
combined with a 10% annual tax on state bank note issues, soon resulted in the 
supplanting of state banks’ notes by the new national bank notes.  
Scholars have long puzzled over the observation that national banks did not take 
greater advantage of the authority to issue notes. The aggregate supply of notes never 
reached its maximum permissible level, despite calculations measuring the profitability 
of allocating capital toward bank note supply collateralized by bonds (e.g., as derived by 
Cagan 1965), indicating that national bank note issuance was more profitable than the 
typical profit earned by allocating bank capital toward lending funded by a combination 
of deposits and capital. Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 23) write: 
Before 1890 the amount outstanding ranged around 20 per cent of the possible 
maximum, by 1900 it had risen to about 28 per cent, and by World War I to about 
80 percent.  The maximum was in fact approached only in the twenties, when for 
the first time U.S. bonds deposited to secure circulation and government deposits 
(which also required such security) nearly equaled the total of eligible bonds. 
Before 1905, the capital stock of national banks set narrower limits to their 
maximum possible note issue than did the total of eligible bonds, but the actual 
issue did not approach this lower limit either.  Thereafter, the capital stock of 
national banks exceeded the total of eligible bonds and hence was not the 
effective limit on note issue.  Yet, despite the failure to use fully the possibilities 
of note issue, the published market prices of government bonds bearing the 
circulation privilege were apparently always low enough to make note issue 
profitable except in the years 1884 to 1891. The fraction of the maximum issued 
fluctuated with the profitability of issue, but the fraction was throughout lower 
than might have been expected.  We have no explanation for this puzzle. 
                                                 
1 After 1874, banks also had to deposit a 5% minimum cash redemption fund at the Treasury in 
addition to these bonds.   4
 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Cagan (1965) argued that profits from note issue 
were large on the margin, because bond issues to back note issues remained cheap and 
because banks could easily leverage their capital devoted to those bond purchases.
2 In 
their discussions of potential constraints on bank note issues, they pointed to the more 
than adequate aggregate supply of bonds, and while they recognized that regulations 
constrained bank note issuing relative to bank capital, they argued that bank capital was 
not a constraint because its aggregate amount exceeded the amount required for 
increased note issues. 
The reasoning typically advanced to explain low issuance of national bank notes 
posits hidden transacting costs, either in the form of the costs of redeeming physical notes 
or the costs of maintaining cash balances in support of bank note issues. Authors such as 
Bell (1912), Cagan (1965), Goodhart (1965), Cagan and Schwartz (1991), Duggar and 
Rost (1969), Champ, Wallace, and Weber (1992), and Wallace and Zhu (2004) argue that 
redemption costs may have been large enough to explain bankers’ reluctance to issue 
despite the seeming profitability from expanding the supply of notes.  
James (1978) was the first to suggest that aggregate calculations, like those 
provided by Cagan and Friedman and Schwartz, might be providing a misleading picture 
of national bank note profitability. He showed that cross-sectional variation in the 
regional supply of bank notes was large and consistent with regional variation in the 
opportunity cost of note issuance (that is, regional variation in the profitability of bank 
                                                 
2 Cagan and Schwartz (1991) point out that we can restate the puzzle of underissuance as the 
puzzling absence of a large premium on U.S. Treasury bonds (i.e., lower bond yields). High 
profits from note issuing should have led national banks to bid up the price of bonds (in order to 
satisfy legal backing requirements for note issues), which should have raised the premium on 
bonds and, thus, eliminated allegedly excess profits.   5
lending). In James’s view, at least some of the puzzle of low bank note issuance was 
explained by the high profitability of bank lending in the South and West, where note 
issuance was relatively low.  But James’s explanation was not a complete one. After 
1874, there were no regional limits on note issuance, suggesting that banks in the East 
(where loan profitability was relatively low) should have substantially increased their 
outstanding notes. Why did the banks in the East not issue more notes? 
Hetherington (1990) showed that some of the time variation in the extent of note 
issue could be explained by changes in rules governing note issues. But that approach did 
not explain the puzzle posed by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Cagan (1965); like 
James’s (1978) explanation of cross-state variation in note issuance, Hetherington’s 
(1990) explanation of some of the variation in supply over time did not address the 
persistent underissue of bank notes: the level of bank notes remained far below its 
maximum despite the high profitability of note issuing.  
In this paper, we test the various theories of note underissuance with 
microeconomic data. We are able to resolve much of the puzzle of note underissuance by 
disaggregating data on national banks and analyzing individual banks’ note issuing 
incentives and constraints. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Cagan (1965) compared 
average profitability of note issuing and lending and considered the aggregate supply of 
bonds and the aggregate amount of bank capital. But that is not the correct way to take 
account of regulatory constraints on note issues. It is possible that regulatory limits on 
bank note issues were binding on many individual banks. If, as James argued, some 
banks faced high opportunity costs (leading them to limit note issuing), and if other banks 
earning lower profits from lending were issuing the maximum amount of notes they were   6
permitted to issue by law, then it may be that there is no puzzle of “underissuance.” We 
take account of the legal constraints facing individual banks that limited their maximum 
(and minimum) permissible note issuance. 
In fact, we will show that many banks (40% of national banks in 1880, 5% in 
1890, and 21% in 1900) were at a “corner solution” (issuing the maximum amount of 
notes they could legally issue), while other banks (which we are able to identify as banks 
with observably higher opportunity costs) chose to issue less than their legal maxima. 
Thus, the puzzle of national bank note issuance turns out to be largely an artifact of 
aggregation error.  
We develop a data set linking the note-issuing behavior of individual banks, the 
specific legal constraints on note issuing faced by each bank, and the profitability of bank 
lending. Our data set consists of individual bank data for all reporting national banks in 
1880, 1890, and 1900. Our measures of the opportunities for lending include banks’ 
characteristics as well as characteristics of the economic environment (county, state, or 
nationwide) in which banks operated.   
Section II models the equilibrium supply and demand for national bank notes and 
describes the legal limits on note supply. Section III reviews our data and summarizes the 
note-issuing behavior of national banks in 1880, 1890, and 1900. Section IV tests and 
rejects the redemption risk theory of underissuance. Section V documents and explains 
the absence of pure note-issuing “arbitrage” strategies by national banks; that is, we show 
why national banks did not enter solely with the purpose of issuing notes. Section VI 
provides a Tobit regression analysis of the extent of individual bank note issues relative 
to their maximum potential level in 1880, 1890, and 1900. The results lend support to   7
James’s opportunity cost theory of note issuing. Section VII analyzes patterns of entry 
and exit by national banks between 1880 and 1900. Entry and exit patterns confirm the 
findings in Sections V and VI, which indicate that note issuing was not a primary profit 
center in U.S. banking. Section VIII concludes. Overall, we find that a combination of 
legal restrictions on maximum note issuing and banks’ opportunity costs explain the 
extent of bank note issuing in a manner consistent with bank profit maximization. 
 
II. Supply and Demand for National Bank Notes 
The quantity of national bank notes in circulation should be determined by supply 
and demand in the market for bank notes. While there were legislative limits placed on 
the aggregate quantity of notes outstanding and on the geographic distribution of note 
issuing, those aggregate limits were never binding constraints on individual bank 
issuance. Prior to 1874, whenever the amount of notes came close to reaching the 
maximum allowable supply, the law was changed to accommodate more note issues.  In 
1874, the law was changed to remove any aggregate limits on note issues, although the 
limited supply of U.S. Treasury bonds (to serve as 111% collateral for note issues) 
effectively placed a non-binding upper bound on the potential supply of notes. 
National bank notes were essentially perfect substitutes for transactions purposes 
with U.S. notes (greenbacks) and coins and traded at par with those alternative 
transacting media (except briefly during 1873, when the special value to banks of holding 
greenbacks, which were a legal reserve currency, led their value to temporarily exceed 
that of bank notes – see Friedman and Schwartz 1963, pp. 21-2). National bank notes and 
greenbacks were always inframarginal sources of transacting media whose quantity was   8
set by suppliers and which were unresponsive to shifts in the demand for transacting 
media; increases in demand for transacting media on the margin were met by changes in 
the supply of specie currency (see Calomiris 1988, 1994, Hetherington 1990).  
Equilibrium in international markets under the classical gold standard 
simultaneously determined gold-denominated interest rates and specie flows to 
equilibrate the markets for goods and money (Calomiris and Hubbard 1996). The supply 
of national bank notes adjusted endogenously to the level of interest rates set in the 
money market. Calomiris (1988, 1994) shows that (so long as the supply of Treasury 
bonds to back national bank notes was greater than the amount demanded for that 
purpose) the supply of national bank notes for banks that were not at a corner solution 
should have been determined by (a) the yield on government bonds, (b) the profitability 
of bank lending, and (c) the tax rate charged on national bank note issues.  The supply of 
notes, in this model, is set by the profit-maximizing choices of national banks about 
whether to allocate marginal capital toward (a) the business of deposit taking and lending 
or (b) the business of producing national bank notes, backed by government bond 
purchases. In any empirical model of cross-sectional differences in note issuance (for 
example, for national banks in 1880), the profitability of lending is the primary influence 
that should predict cross-sectional differences in the propensity to issue notes, since the 
taxation rate and market yield on bonds are the same for all banks.
3  
Of course, this model does not apply on the margin to banks that are at a corner 
solution, either because of legal limits on maximum issues that require them to issue less 
than they would like, or legal limits on minimum issues that require them to issue more 
                                                 
3 It is also possible that banks with comparative advantage in taking deposits (e.g., banks that had 
an advantage in obtaining interbank deposits) would issue fewer notes, holding constant their loan 
opportunities.  We investigate this possibility in our empirical analysis below.   9
than they would like. Among banks issuing the maximum permissible amount of notes, 
cross-sectional variation in bank characteristics should have no explanatory power for 
marginal note issuing, although those cross-sectional characteristics should help explain 
which banks are at a corner solution. Thus, before applying the model to individual bank 
data, we first take account of the various limits on note issuing that might constrain banks 
to operate at a corner solution. 
Prior to 1882, the limits on note issues relating to capital for national banks were a 
complex function of the capital levels and bond holdings of banks, and these limits varied 
by the size of the bank and (because of grandfathering) by the date the bank was 
chartered. These constraints, which are summarized in Table 1, are take from Laws of the 
United States Concerning Money, Banking, and Loans, 1778-1909, compiled by the 
National Monetary Commission (1910). A bank chartered before March 1865 could not 
issue notes in excess of 100% of the bank’s paid-in capital. A bank chartered from March 
1865 through July 1870 was governed by the following limits on note issue relative to 
capital: A bank with capital less than $500,000 could issue up to 90% of capital; a bank 
with capital between $500,000 and $1,000,000 could issue up to 80% of capital; a bank 
with capital between $1,000,000 and $3,000,000 could issue up to 75% of capital; and a 
bank with capital in excess of $3,000,000 could issue up to 60% of capital.  Banks 
chartered after July 12, 1870 were governed by the following limits: No bank could issue 
more than $500,000 in notes; banks with capital less than $500,000 could issue up to 
90% of capital; and banks with capital between $500,000 and $625,000 could issue up to 
80% of capital. In 1882, those requirements were supplanted by a single measure of 
maximum note issue of 90% capital for all banks. (The complexity of regulations on the   10
maximum before 1882 is the primary reason why previous literature has focused nearly 
exclusively on the period after that year.) National banks that also had outstanding state 
bank issues (dating from the time before they became national banks) had to include 
those notes in any measure of total permissible note issues.  
All banks also faced an effective minimum note-issuing requirement, since all 
national banks were required to maintain government bond holdings of at least $30,000 
or an amount equal to one-third of bank capital, whichever was higher. (That requirement 
was reduced to a maximum of $25,000 or 25% of capital for banks with capital less than 
$150,000 in 1882.) To the extent that a bank was constrained to hold the minimum 
amount of government bonds, issuing notes backed by those bonds would have always 
been profitable (Hetherington 1990).  As we shall show below, these ceilings and floors 
on permissible note issues were often binding on individual banks. 
 
III. Data on Individual Banks 
Our data set consists of hand-collected information on 2,090 national banks in 
1880, 3,540 national banks in 1890, and 3,861 national banks in 1900. We also collected 
data about the states and counties in which those banks resided. Data on counties are 
available only for decadal census dates. We chose 1880 as a starting date for several 
reasons. First, by 1880, it is reasonable to assume that banks had adjusted to the effects of 
the changes on note-issuing limits in 1874. Second, in January 1879, the U.S. resumed 
convertibility of dollars into gold, an event that had been anticipated for several years 
prior to that time (Calomiris 1988). Analyzing note supply after resumption of 
convertibility simplifies the discussion by permitting us to abstract from various   11
complications associated with deflationary expectations during the 1870s (Calomiris 
1988). Third, as the above quotation from Friedman and Schwartz (1963) shows, they 
regard the underissuance of national bank notes during the periods before 1884 and after 
1891 as especially puzzling. According to Cagan (1965, p. 93), profitability on note 
issuing rose during the 1890s and accelerated as the result of the Gold Standard Act of 
March 1900. Like 1880, 1900 was a time of relatively high profitability from note 
issuing; both years have been viewed by previous scholars as times of puzzling 
underissuance of profitable national bank notes. 
The dependent variable we analyze is the extent to which banks issued their 
maximum permissible amount of national bank notes. Specifically, the dependent 
variable, Issue Propensity (IP), is defined as:  
 
IP =   (Actual Notes – Minimum Required Issuance) /  
(Maximum Permissible Notes – Minimum Required Issuance) 
 
  Here, the “minimum required issuance” is defined as the amount of note issuance 
that would have been backed by the minimum amount of required government bond 
holdings. Issuing notes backed by government bonds that had to be held in any case did 
not impose any lending opportunity cost on the issuer. Since the sum of interest cost on 
notes (zero) plus note taxes was always less than the interest cost on deposits, absent any 
additional cost of issuing notes (e.g., redemption costs), banks would choose to issue 
notes as allowed by law to finance their minimum required holdings of bonds. Of course, 
in the presence of redemption costs, banks may choose to issue less than the “minimum   12
required issuance.” Nevertheless, in light of evidence we present below that rejects the 
importance of such redemption costs, we define the minimum required issuance as the 
amount allowed by the minimum required bond holdings. If we had, instead, defined the 
minimum level of note issuance as zero, our results would not be materially affected.
4 
Table 2 provides definitions of all the variables used in this study. Table 3 
provides summary statistics. We assume that banks with IP greater than 98% are 
effectively at their maximum amount of note issue (given potential rounding effects from 
the minimum denomination of bond issues and random variation in outstanding notes 
associated with redemptions). Thus, we assign all banks with a value of IP greater than or 
equal to 0.98 a truncated value of IP equal to 0.98. Similarly, we assign banks with a 
value of IP less than 0.02 a truncated value of IP equal to 0.02. Our truncated measure of 
IP, therefore, varies between 0.02 and 0.98. As shown in Table 3, in 1880 the median 
value of IPTRUNC is 0.8571 and the mean is 0.7640. Fully 75% of national banks in 
1880 have values of IPTRUNC greater than 0.7007. 
Using 0.98 as our truncated measure of maximum note issuance, 40% of national 
banks in 1880 were issuing the maximum amount of notes permitted. In other words, 
40% of national banks were at a maximum corner solution in their issuing of national 
bank notes. Another 7% of national banks in 1880 were at a minimum corner solution 
(with a truncated value of IP equal to 0.02). The remaining 53% of national banks in 
1880 had IP values between the truncated minimum and maximum values. Figure 1 plots 
                                                 
4 It is true that some banks issued less than the amount of notes implied by the minimum bond holding 
requirement. Specifically, 79 banks in 1880, 1,201 banks in 1890, and 895 banks in 1900 issued fewer 
notes than the “minimum note issuance” as we define it. Some of this seems to reflect newly chartered 
banks, which possibly had not received their notes yet. Rounding problems or temporarily low levels of 
note issuance may explain other observations. Only 24 banks maintained note issues below the “minimum 
note issuance” amount for all three years in our sample.    13
a histogram of the distribution of the truncated value of IP for all banks in 1880. Figure 2 
plots a histogram of IP for the 53% of national banks that were neither at the maximum 
nor at the minimum in 1880. 
Table 3 shows that the distribution of IP changed considerably by 1890. In 1890 
the median value of IPTRUNC is 0.0200 and the mean is 0.1100. Only 10% of national 
banks in 1890 have values of IP greater than 0.3300. Using 0.98 as our truncated measure 
of maximum note issuance, 5% of national banks in 1880 were issuing the maximum 
amount of notes permitted. A full 82% of national banks in 1890 were at a minimum 
corner solution (with a truncated value of IP equal to 0.02). The remaining 13% of 
national banks in 1890 had IP values between the truncated minimum and maximum 
values. Figure 3 plots a histogram of the distribution of the truncated value of IP for all 
banks in 1890. Figure 4 plots a histogram of IP for the 13% of national banks that were 
neither at the maximum nor at the minimum in 1890. 
Table 3 shows that the distribution of IP had again changed considerably by 
1900.In 1900 the median value of IPTRUNC is 0.0667 and the mean is 0.3410. Only 
25% of national banks in 1900 have values of IP greater than 0.7675. Again using 0.02 as 
our truncated measure of minimum note issuance, 49% of national banks in 1900 were 
issuing the minimum amount of notes permitted. In other words, 49% of national banks 
were at a minimum corner solution in their issuing of national bank notes. Another 21% 
of national banks in 1990 were at a maximum corner solution (with a truncated value of 
IP equal to 0.98). The remaining 30% of national banks in 1900 had IP values between 
the truncated minimum and maximum values. Figure 5 plots a histogram of the 
distribution of the truncated value of IP for all banks in 1900. Figure 6 plots a histogram   14
of IP for the 30% of national banks that were neither at the maximum nor at the minimum 
in 1900. 
Figure 7 plots the geographical distribution of national banks in 1880, 1890, and 
1900 according to whether they were minimum issuers, maximum issuers, or other 
issuers (which we call “discretionary” issuers). We divide the United States into six 
regions: the Middle Atlantic (MIDATL), the Midwest (MIDWEST), the South (SOUTH), 
Appalachia (APPAL), the West (WEST), and the New England (NEWENGL). Given the 
high physical costs of operating banks in cities and the potentially more profitable 
lending opportunities there, we expected major cities’ national banks to display less 
propensity to issue bank notes. Banks in New York City (NYC) are separately 
considered. We also consider the more general category of urban (URBAN) banks 
(defined as banks located in the major cities of New York, Philadelphia, Boston, 
Chicago, New Orleans, or San Francisco).  
Figure 7 shows that there were average differences across regions in IPTRUNC in 
1880 and that those differences often appear in 1890 and 1900, with some exceptions. For 
each year, Figure 7 plots the ratio of each region’s mean value of IPTRUNC divided by 
the national average value of IPTRUNC in that year. Values greater than one are above 
the national average; values less than one are below the national average. In all three 
years, New England and the Middle Atlantic display above-average note issuance. 
Appalachia shows above-average issuance in 1880 and 1900 but below-average issuance 
in 1890. The Midwest, the South, and the West have IPTRUNC values below the national 
average in all three years. Interestingly, urban banks issue below average in all three 
years. New York City banks issue below average in 1880 and 1890 but above the national   15
average in 1900. Changes over time in the propensity to issue may reflect fundamental 
changes in the profitability of note issuing within a given location, a possibility we 
explore in more detail below.  
The evidence on regional variation in note issuance is consistent with James’s 
(1978) opportunity cost explanation for cross-sectional differences in note issuance, but it 
is conceivable that other factors (e.g., regional variation in redemption risks and their 
associated costs) could also explain these patterns. Thus, before returning to an empirical 
investigation of the James hypothesis, we first investigate the extent to which redemption 
risk might explain cross-sectional variation in note issuance. 
 
IV. The Redemption Risk Theory of Underissuance 
Cagan (1965, p. 95) was the first to specifically point to redemption risk as the 
most likely explanation for the low issuance of national bank notes: 
  The slow expansion [of national bank notes] suggests that national  
banks waited until it seemed certain that no reason to withdraw the notes 
would arise in the near future. Why a withdrawal need be feared, however, 
is not clear. 
Cagan (p. 89) argued that the amount national banks held on deposit at the Treasury in 
excess of the 5% minimum required redemption fund likely reflected, at least in part, a 
form of precautionary reserve holdings, which should be included in the cost of issuing 
notes. More generally, advocates of hidden redemption costs as the solution to the puzzle 
of national bank note issuance have focused on the risks of unpredictable redemption.  
For example, Wallace and Zhu (2004) argue that issuers limited note issues because 
higher issuance increased the propensity for redemption; in their formulation, the amount 
of notes that could be profitably “floated” was “subject to diminishing returns.”   16
As Cagan recognized, it is not obvious that redemption risk should have been 
significant in practice. National banks could pay out to the public each other’s notes 
received from the public, and notes were free of default risk; thus, it is not clear why 
notes would be presented at the Treasury or at any national bank for redemption, rather 
than continuing to circulate among banks and the public at par (except for reasons of 
wear and tear).
5 Furthermore, national banks could instruct the Treasury to sell bonds on 
deposit at the Treasury to pay for redemption or borrow in the interbank market (from a 
bank that could take funds to the Treasury as needed) to finance redemption on short 
notice. To the extent that transportation costs and idle notes may have represented hidden 
redemption costs, the Treasury routinely accepted notes for redemption at subtreasury 
offices located in large reserve cities.
6 Even if notes could not be reissued quickly after 
being returned from the Treasury, banks could still invest them in the interbank deposit 
market, which yielded about 2% throughout our period.  
Cagan’s discussion suggests a straightforward test of the proposition that the costs 
of unpredictable redemption were important and that the 5% minimum redemption fund 
did not adequately eliminate the risk of redemption. If unpredictable redemption costs 
were important, then national banks would have maintained excess reserves on deposit at 
the Treasury (or perhaps in their vaults) to ensure their ability to redeem notes on 
demand. 
                                                 
5 Indeed, Cagan and Schwartz (1991) provide detailed criticisms of various arguments advanced 
by other authors in support of the idea that redemption costs were significant. Cagan and 
Schwartz also note (p. 303) that, circa 1900, notes were redeemed on average only once every 32 
months. 
6 Cagan and Schwartz (1991) cite estimates that some 85% to 90% of banks whose notes were 
redeemed were located in those large reserve cities (p. 300).   17
Empirically, we can test whether higher amounts of note issuance result in a 
greater demand for reserves. Because the size of excess reserves maintained at the 
Treasury and in bank vaults by each national bank is observable, we can test whether 
national banks held precautionary balances against note issues and whether the need for 
excess reserves to mitigate the costs of redemption risk rises with greater note issuance. 
Furthermore, given the possibility of exogenous differences across regions in redemption 
costs, we can test for regional effects in the demand for reserves to see if these regional 
differences can explain regional differences in the propensity to issue notes.  
The first thing to note about national banks’ excess balances at the Treasury is 
that they were quite small. In 1880, aggregate total excess reserves at the Treasury were 
0.47% of total outstanding national bank notes. In 1890, they were 0.66% of national 
bank notes, and in 1900, they were 0.56% of national bank notes. The cross-sectional 
(bank-level) average of Treasury reserves to national bank notes outstanding was 
0.6153% in 1880, 0.6377% in 1890, and 0.7505% in 1900, while the standard error of the 
ratio of excess Treasury reserves to national bank notes outstanding was 0.0010701 in 
1880, 0.0013104 in 1890, and 0.0012383 in 1900. Clearly, the average precautionary 
demand for excess reserves at the Treasury to mitigate the risk of sudden redemption was 
small.
7 
We employ regression analysis to test for a relationship between the scale of bank 
note issue and the amount of excess reserves. If banks were concerned about redemption 
risk, and if the desired excess reserve ratio is a constant fraction of notes outstanding 
                                                 
7 Note that in 1880 the comptroller reports the sum of the 5% redemption fund and excess reserves, while in 
later years, the redemption fund and excess reserves are broken into separate data fields.    18
(after controlling for regional differences and other bank characteristics), then banks with 
larger amounts of notes should hold larger amounts of excess reserves.  
Table 4 presents a simple regression analysis of narrow reserves held at the 
Treasury (since Cagan emphasized that component) as a ratio of total bank liabilities 
(assets minus net worth), which we call TER, and the ratio of excess cash reserves 
(including funds at the Treasury as well as those in the bank’s vault) relative to total bank 
liabilities, which we call NER, for 1880, 1890, and 1900. The model of the determinants 
of reserve demand is taken from Calomiris and Mason (2004).  
The excess reserve demand regressions measure the relationship between excess 
reserve holdings and various bank characteristics. Characteristics include bank balance-
sheet characteristics and bank-location characteristics. Location is captured both by 
regional indicators and by indicators that capture whether the bank is located in a 
“reserve city” or a “central reserve city”. Banks located in reserve cities or central reserve 
cities faced different regulatory requirements for deposits and also different business 
opportunities, which may have affected their demand for reserves. 
Bank balance-sheet characteristics include bank leverage (total liabilities relative 
to total assets, TLTA), the total amount of bank liabilities (log of total liabilities, LNTL), 
and various measures of the mix of liabilities, the mix of assets, and the location of the 
bank. Economies of scale in transactions demand for reserves are a common feature of all 
empirical money demand models (Baumol 1952, Tobin 1956, Miller and Orr 1966) and 
implies a negative relationship between total liabilities and the demand for reserves.  
Our measures of liability mix allow the demand for reserves to depend on liability 
composition, which is likely to reflect differences in the volatility of withdrawals or   19
redemptions (as modeled in Miller and Orr 1966). These variables include the ratio of 
bank notes relative to total liabilities (NTL), its square, NTLSQ (to allow for non-
linearity in this effect), and measures of deposit mix.  Deposits are divided into three 
categories: U.S. government deposits, interbank deposits, and deposits of the public. The 
ratio of U.S. government deposits to total deposits is USDTD, and the ratio of interbank 
deposits to total deposits is IBDTD. The ratio of public deposits to total deposits is the 
omitted category of deposits.  
We also include the ratio of loans and discounts relative to securities (after 
omitting U.S. government securities held as backing for bank notes), which we call 
LOANRAT. LOANRAT can be thought of as a measure of the attractiveness of bank 
lending opportunities as reflected in banks’ asset mix decisions. Calomiris and Wilson 
(2004) show that superior lending opportunities result in lower reserve demand, ceteris 
paribus. 
We focus here on the relationship between increases in bank notes and the 
demand for excess reserves. Cagan’s precautionary reserve-demand hypothesis implies 
that an increase in the total amount of national bank notes issued by the bank should 
result in an increase in excess reserve holdings of the issuing bank.  
The regressions in Table 4 show that there is no statistically significant 
relationship between the amount of national bank notes and the level of excess cash 
reserves (measured either by TER or NER). Banks that issued larger amounts of notes, 
ceteris paribus, did not hold larger amounts of excess cash reserves. Furthermore, with 
the exception of the South, there is no evidence of regional variation in the target excess 
reserve ratio of reserves held at the Treasury (TER). There is some evidence of regional   20
variation in NER, but that variation is not consistent over time, and it does not correspond 
with the regional variation in note issuing described by James or by Figure 7. We 
conclude that narrowly defined excess cash reserves (whether held at the Treasury or in 
the bank vault) were generally unrelated to bank note issue. That evidence suggests that 
banks believed that their 5% minimum redemption fund was more than adequate to 
handle redemption risks from note issuance. Consequently, we conclude that the 
hypothesized costly maintenance of cash balances to mitigate redemption risk cannot 
explain the puzzle of underissuance of national bank notes.  
In Table 5, we broaden our definition of excess reserves to include total reserves 
(specie, legal tender, deposits at the Treasury, plus deposits held at other banks) minus 
the amount of required reserves (either at the bank or at the Treasury), relative to total 
liabilities, which we call BER. We find that broadly defined reserve holdings are 
negatively related to note issue and that this relationship is statistically significant.   
It is important to remember that the relationship between notes and excess 
reserves in Tables 4 and 5 is not univariate. As noted before, expanding the bank size to 
increase note issuance implies not only an additional effect through NTLSQ but also a 
commensurate (111%) increase in assets and liabilities. Hence, Table 6 presents the total 
marginal effects on excess reserves of a $100,000 increase in bank size brought about by 
increasing note issuance accounting for the appropriate changes in TLTA, LNTL, NTL, 
and NTLSQ at the variable means. The resulting marginal effect of increased note issue 
is zero in 1880 and 1890 for the narrowest classes of reserves and negative for all other 
classes of reserves and time periods in Table 4, and negative for the broadest class of   21
reserves estimated in Table 4. Hence, it appears that note redemption was not a risk that 
was magnified by increased note issue.  
The results in Tables 4 and 5 not only contradict the redemption risk hypothesis, 
but they also suggest a significant reduction in reserve management costs from issuing 
notes for the average bank. We interpret this result as reflecting a complementarity 
(economy of scope) between, on the one hand, note issuing, and on the other hand, 
deposit taking and lending, which resulted from the fact that the 5% minimum cash 
reserve requirement on notes was more than the amount warranted by actual redemption 
risk on notes. Under that hypothesis, note-issuing banks could economize on the costs of 
maintaining desired reserves associated with deposit taking and lending (motivated, for 
example, by portfolio risk reduction) because the unwarranted high required reserves 
against notes could be applied toward reducing the amount of excess reserves needed in 
the deposit taking and lending arm of the bank. In other words, taken together, the results 
in Tables 4 and 5 indicate that redemption risks for notes were unusually low and were 
more than adequately dealt with by the minimum cash reserves held at the Treasury. 
Excessive required reserves on note issues, however, reduced the demand for excess 
reserves for other purposes. The economies of scope in reserve management also help to 
explain why national banks combined deposit taking and note issuing, rather than 
specializing in note issuing, since combining the two reduced the cost of note issuing 
(more on this point in Section V below). 
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V. The Absence of Pure Arbitrage Strategies 
The fact that many banks issued the maximum permissible amount of notes in 
1880 and 1900 presents us with two related puzzles of underissuance. First, we must 
explain why some banks in existence did not issue the maximum amount of notes they 
could (we return to that question in Section VI below). Second, we must also explain the 
lack of entry by pure “arbitragers” into the note-issuing business. That second question is 
addressed here. 
If note issuing were profitable, and if existing banks willing to issue notes had 
already issued their legal maximum or had deployed their equity capital in the pursuit of 
profitable alternative opportunities, we might still expect bank entry by new, purely note-
issuing banks. The scarcity of financial or human capital in the banking industry (which 
was already being employed in other banks) would not constrain such investors, since 
they had no need for knowledge of the businesses of lending and deposit taking. We 
characterize entry by investors to establish a wholly note-issuing national bank as a “pure 
arbitrage” strategy for issuing notes. In essence, such an arbitrage strategy would be a 
means of taking advantage of an interest rate subsidy on “margin loans” from the 
government for the purpose of purchasing government bonds.  
Interestingly, no national banks pursued this pure arbitrage strategy. As shown in 
Table 7, which summarizes data on the 10 banks in 1880 that had the lowest ratios of 
assets other than government bonds relative to total assets (OTHASS) and the 10 banks in 
1880 that had the lowest ratios of deposits to assets (DEPASS), all national banks were 
involved in lending/investment and deposit taking to some degree. For example, 
Montpelier National Bank, which maintained the lowest OTHASS ratio, had an OTHASS   23
ratio of 31.6% and a DEPASS ratio of 50.8%.  Casco National Bank, which maintained 
the lowest DEPASS ratio of any seasoned bank, had an OTHASS ratio of 97.2% and a 
DEPASS ratio of 33.2%. Results for 1890 and 1900 (not reported here) are similar to 
those reported in Table 7, although two banks in 1890 displayed low DEPASS ratios of 
6.0% and 19.6% and two banks in 1900 displayed low DEPASS ratios of 5.5% and 5.6%. 
But those four banks displayed OTHASS ratios of 76.5% and 59.8%, and 52.7% and 
53.7%, respectively. 
When we consider the practical obstacles to pursuing a profitable pure arbitrage 
strategy, it is not surprising that no national banks did so. A bank in 1880 establishing 
itself solely to issue notes would have pursued only one of two strategies (summarized, 
respectively, in Figures 8 and 9). The first strategy (illustrated in Figure 8) – to issue the 
maximum amount of notes, equal to $500,000 – implied a required capital investment of 
$625,000 in initial equity capital and an additional $125,000 in surplus capital, for a total 
equity investment of $750,000.
8  The bank would also have been required to maintain a 
$25,000 redemption fund at the Treasury. The remaining $1,225,000 could be held in 
government bonds. Long-term government bonds yielded roughly 3.5% in 1880.
9 The 
pre-tax annual earnings on these bonds would have been $42,875. The bank also had to 
pay a tax equal to 1% of its outstanding national bank notes, or $5,000. Thus, even if the 
bank faced no physical costs of operating, its after-tax earnings would equal $37,875, 
implying a return on equity capital of 5.05%.   
                                                 
8 The initial capital investment is necessary to satisfy the regulation that notes must be less than 
80% of capital if capital is above $500,000. The surplus capital requirement is set according to 
the requirements of Sections 33 and 38 of the National Bank Act of June 3, 1864, which requires 
that banks accumulate and retain surplus equal to 20% of paid-in capital. 
9 According to Homer and Sylla (1991), p. 316, in 1880, U.S. government bonds maturing in 
1891 had a yield to maturity of 3.45%, and U.S. government bonds maturing in 1907 had a yield 
to maturity of 3.63%.   24
A second possible strategy for 1880 is summarized in Figure 9. Here the bank 
issues fewer notes ($449,999) in order to maintain paid-in capital just below $500,000 
and, thus, be able to issue 90% of its capital in notes (as opposed to only 80% of capital). 
Assuming zero operating expenses, this bank has after-tax earnings of $31,463, and a 
return on equity of 5.24%.  
Interest rates on government bonds declined over the period 1880 to 1900. By 
1890, long-term yields on the 4s of 1907 had fallen to 2.37%. In 1900, long-term 
Treasury bond yields were even lower, ranging from 1.7% on the 4s of 1907 to 2.12% on 
the 4s of 1925, implying substantially lower returns on equity from a pure arbitrage 
strategy.
10 Assuming a Treasury bond yield of 2% for 1900, and using the same methods 
for computing profitability as in Figures 8 and 9, the banks issuing $500,000 and 
$449,999 in notes, respectively, would earn returns on equity of 2.6% and 2.8%.  
This method for computing returns on equity results in values that are lower than 
those described by Cagan or Friedman and Schwartz, but they are still unrealistically 
high. A national bank would have undoubtedly had some minimal costs of operation, 
even if it did not engage in lending or deposit taking. National banking law required at 
least five members of the board of directors (who would have to meet and be 
compensated for their time), and the hiring of employees (a president, vice president, and 
cashier), the regular filing of accounts, the maintenance of a headquarters, and regular 
bank examinations paid for by the national bank being examined. Section 54 of the Bank 
Act of 1864 requires that examiners be compensated at the rate of $5 a day, plus $2 per 
25 miles traveled on their way to the bank, all billed to the bank. We conservatively 
estimate the physical costs of running a bare bones bank (rent, maintenance costs, wages, 
                                                 
10 Homer and Sylla (1991), p. 343.   25
examination fees, and accounting costs) at roughly $1,000 per year. That estimate 
assumes that directors and officers serve at no cost, assumes a wage cost of $750 per year 
(the estimated cost of employing a cashier to keep the bank’s premises, manage its 
accounts, and meet with the examiner, assuming that the cashier is paid $2.50 per day), 
and rental, maintenance, and examination costs of an additional $250 per year. We add to 
those costs the comptroller’s initial redemption cost estimates in the range of $62.50 per 
$100,000 of notes, which Goodhart and others argued rose considerably owing to 
seasonal fluctuations in demand for monetary medium. Under these assumptions, total 
operating costs for the banks operating in 1880, described in Figures 8 and 9, equal 
$1,313 and $1,281, respectively. Those costs imply returns on equity of 4.87% and 
5.03%, respectively. For the analogous banks operating in 1900, the implied returns on 
equity would be 2.43% and 2.54%, respectively. Our estimates of physical costs are very 
conservative, which may explain why the implied returns on equity are still above the 
comptroller’s minuscule estimates of returns to note issuance of 50-175 basis points in 
1880 (Annual Report, p. 8). Nevertheless, these returns are quite modest, especially 
considering the fact that note issuing did imply substantial interest rate risk.
11 
Another way to think about the profit from the pure arbitrage strategy, which 
takes into account interest rate risk, is to compare it to a similarly leveraged purchase of 
government bonds. For example, assume that a state-chartered bank had established itself 
purely with the intent of investing in government bonds and had borrowed on the 
interbank deposit market to fund that investment. Assume also that it chose to maintain 
the same balance sheet amounts as in Figures 8 and 9, but substituted interbank deposits 
for national bank notes as a source of finance. That state-chartered bank would have been 
                                                 
11 For further discussion of interest rate risk, see Kuehlwein (1992).   26
in a somewhat inferior position to a national bank pursuing a pure arbitrage strategy for 
two reasons: (1) the interest cost on interbank deposits is greater than the cost of finance 
from bank notes (which is just the 1% tax on note issues), and (2) the national bank does 
not bear as much interest rate risk as the state-chartered bank, since increases in interest 
rates have no effect on the required return paid on national bank notes (which are always 
zero).  
Interbank deposit funding imposes an interest cost of roughly 2% during our time 
period.
12  Thus, abstracting from interest rate risk differences, the annual after-tax 
national bank “subsidy” for its zero-interest margin loan from the government for 
investing in government bonds would have been roughly 1% of the amount of notes 
issued ($5,000 in the first example, and $4,500 in the second example).  
The difference in interest rate risk can be captured by considering the difference 
in the sensitivity of bank equity to variation in the yields on long-term bonds for the two 
hypothetical banks. For concreteness, assume that both the national and state-chartered 
hypothetical banks had a Macaulay duration of assets of 10 years (reflecting their 
holdings of government bonds with average maturities in excess of 10 years). 
Alternatively, assume that the arbitragers expected to operate the banks for 10 years and 
then liquidate them, implying a duration of 10 years for bank notes.
13 Assume that 
interbank deposits used to finance the state-chartered bank had a duration of 90 days and 
                                                 
12 John James (1976, p. 200) writes: “…explicit payment of interest was becoming a pervasive 
practice in New York by the late 1880s, and at that time also the rate of interest stabilized at 2 
percent…” 
13 Alternatively, one could assume an indefinite maturity of bank notes, if the founders of the 
bank could have sold their stock in the bank to others upon their retirement. In the event, changes 
in monetary regime rules brought an end to the license to issue national bank notes, and this was a 
risk that arguably was known in advance. Thus, we think a 10-year expectation for the operation 
of a representative national bank’s license to issue notes is reasonable. Reasonable variation in 
that assumption will not change our conclusions.    27
assume (to be consistent with the examples in Figures 8 and 9) that the ratio of debt to 
assets was 0.4. In a simple, one-factor model of interest rate risk, the sensitivity 
(percentage decline) of bank equity value resulting from a 1% rise in interest rates for the 
banks we consider is given by the following equation:  
DK  = A/K [DA – (L/A) DL].  
Under the above assumptions, the values of DK for the national and state-chartered banks 
would be as follows: For the national bank, DK = 1.67 [10 - (0.4)10] = 10. For the state-
chartered bank, DK = 1.67 [10 – (0.4)(0.25)] = 16.53. 
  How much would this difference in interest rate risk have mattered for the value 
of the national bank? Judging from the small yield differences in 1880 on government 
bonds with maturity dates of 1891 and 1907 (the first of which had a duration less than 
10 years, and the second of which had a duration greater than 17 years), the market did 
not view the added risk as very great. According to Homer and Sylla (1991, p. 316), in 
1880, U.S. government bonds maturing in 1891 had a yield to maturity of 3.45%, and 
U.S. government bonds maturing in 1907 had a yield to maturity of 3.63%, implying a 
difference of 18 basis points.
14 We conservatively estimate the value of the reduced risk 
to the national bank at roughly 20 basis points of return on equity per year. In the 
example in Figure 8, for 1880, that would amount to $1,500 of added annual value, 
bringing the total subsidy to a pure arbitrager (before expenses) of $6,500 per year. In the 
example in Figure 9, for 1880, the 20-basis-point premium would add $1,200 of added 
annual value, raising the total subsidy (before expenses) to $5,700 per year. The 
analogous additions for 1890 and 1900 would be smaller. 
                                                 
14 The difference for 1900 was even smaller. The Treasury bond maturing in 1907 had a yield of 
1.70%, while the bond maturing in 1925 had a yield of 2.12% (Homer and Sylla 1991, p. 343).   28
  Thus, around 1880, the annual gain (gross of physical expenses) from pursuing 
the pure arbitrage strategy, taking into account the value from interest payments savings 
and reduced interest rate risk, was roughly $6,500 on an equity investment of $750,000, 
or $5,700 on an equity investment of $600,000 – in both cases, less than 1% of equity 
invested.  The gain from the subsidy net of physical expenses would have been 
substantially lower and possibly negative. In other words, the gain from using a national 
bank charter as a vehicle for investing in U.S. government securities was nearly zero, and 
perhaps negative, after we take into account physical costs and the cost of risk. For 1890 
and 1900, that gain was even smaller. 
In summary, as an empirical matter, banks did not pursue the pure arbitrage 
strategy. When we consider the limitations on leverage from the banking regulations, the 
taxes on note issues, and the cost of operating even a “bare bones” national bank, it is not 
surprising that pure arbitrage remained a hypothetical opportunity. Note issuance was not 
profitable as a stand-alone strategy for a bank; note issuing was profitable only when 
combined with lending and deposit taking. Note issuing was not the primary profit center 
for a national bank. Note issuing, by itself, was not a viable business; its profitability 
depended on economies of scope between note issuing and other banking functions due 
to sharing physical costs of operating and diversifying risks. The empirical work in 
Section VII further confirms that note issuing was of small and declining profitability 
over time, as indicated by the low propensity to issue notes by banks entering between 
1880 and 1900.   29
VI. Regression Analysis 
We turn to regression analysis of our truncated measure of IP.  We consider 
whether observable differences in the attributes of issuers related to the opportunity cost 
of issuing notes (i.e., lending profitability) explain their propensities to issue notes. As we 
discussed above, and as James (1978) hypothesized, a bank’s opportunities other than 
note issuing should have been important determinants of IP. Our measures of bank 
opportunity costs, which we expect to be negatively associated with IP, take account of a 
variety of those potentially relevant factors.   
First, as a measure of lending opportunities we include a measure of asset returns 
– for assets other than U.S. Treasury securities held to secure note circulation – of banks 
in the state in which the national bank is located, as one measure of bank profitability 
(bank-level or county-level data on banks’ revenues and costs are not available). ROAL 
is constructed by adjusting state-level ROA to remove the effect of interest earned on 
U.S. Treasuries securing note circulation, using data on that year’s Treasury yields and 
data on state-level note circulation to calculate the amount of Treasury securities backing 
note issues. Of course, ROAL is a noisy indicator of lending opportunities for individual 
banks because it is a state-level aggregate and also because it fails to capture dynamic 
growth or contraction in expected loan opportunities, which would be relevant to bank 
decisions about allocating capital between note production and lending. Thus, as 
additional bank-level proxies, we also consider two other measures.  
We include the individual bank’s ratio of loans and discounts relative to its 
holdings of securities (other than the U.S. Treasury bonds held to secure note circulation). 
Banks with superior lending opportunities should maintain a higher LOANRAT. This   30
measure captures the portfolio allocation decisions of each bank and takes into account 
expectations of loan profitability. 
Finally, we include additional measures of opportunity cost related to the growth 
and profitability of agriculture and manufacturing within the county (or counties) in 
which the bank is located, weighted by the importance of those sectors in the county 
economy. For 1880, 1890, and 1900, decadal census years, data on the amount of capital 
in manufacturing and in agriculture are available. These variables can be used to measure 
the relative importance (weight) of each of the two sectors in the local county economy 
and also the growth rate of capital for each 10-year period prior to 1880, 1890, and 1900. 
The variables WDFK and WDMK measure the weighted growth in farm and 
manufacturing capital within the county (or counties) in which the bank is located, for 
1880, 1890, and 1900. Additionally, for 1890 and 1900, census data are also available on 
the profitability of the manufacturing sector. Hence, for 1890 and 1900, we include the 
weighted return on capital assets in manufacturing (WROAM) instead of WDMK as an 
alternative measure of manufacturing profitability. 
We also include various control variables in our analysis related to the size, age, 
and urban location of banks. Size is defined as asset size (SIZE) and bank age (AGE) is 
defined as years since its national bank charter.  The relationships between IP and bank 
size and age are potentially complex. Ceteris paribus, because older banks were initially 
allowed different maximum issue sizes, their IPs could be lower (because, ceteris paribus, 
they are less likely to be constrained in their desired amounts of issues). Larger banks, 
ceteris paribus, could have higher IP because they are more likely to be constrained by 
the maximum issuance limit. But those implications about ceteris paribus associations   31
may not hold true in measured associations between IP and size and age variables 
because size and age might be associated with marginal lending opportunities (more on 
this point in Section VII below). Older and larger banks might have surplus capital 
relative to new lending opportunities, for example, which could lead to a higher value of 
IP. Thus, we include SIZE, AGE, and SIZExAGE as controls, since all three may be 
relevant for predicting note issuing propensity, although we recognize that there are 
multiple interpretations of the measured effects associated with these variables. 
We also include separate indicator variables to control for any special 
characteristics of banks located in New York City (NYC) and for banks located in other 
major cities listed above (URBAN).  
In Tables 8, 9, and 10 (for national banks in 1880, 1890, and 1900, respectively) 
we report Tobit regressions, which take into account the truncations that result from 
minimum and maximum note issuing rules and which measure the effects of opportunity 
cost and control variables. For each year, we report specifications that alternately include 
or exclude regional indicator variables. We begin with regressions that exclude all the 
opportunity cost variables but include regional indicators (a regression that is analogous 
to James’s 1978 results). For 1880, we report three regressions: (1) with regional 
indicators but without opportunity costs, (2) without regional indicators but with 
opportunity costs, and (3) with both regional indicators and opportunity costs. For 1890 
and 1900, we report four regressions, since we have two alternative measures of county-
level profitability of manufacturing (WDMK and WROAM).    
The results are broadly consistent with one another and with our hypothesized 
opportunity cost effects. They indicate substantial variation in the propensity to issue   32
national bank notes that is traceable to county, state, and bank-specific characteristics 
related to the profitability of lending. State-level ROAL enters negatively in 1890 and 
1900, and it is statistically significant. Bank-level LOANRAT enters negatively and 
significantly in all years. County-level WDFK enters negatively and significantly in all 
years, although it is less significant in 1900. WDMK enters negatively and insignificantly 
for 1880, 1890, and 1900, but the alternative measure of manufacturing profitability 
(WROAM) enters negatively and significantly in both 1890 and 1900 (the only years for 
which that variable is available). 
It is also interesting to note that the coefficients for the regional indicator 
variables for MIDWEST, SOUTH, and WEST remain negative and statistically 
significant in the presence of the opportunity cost variables, which indicates that our 
measures of opportunity cost still do not capture all of the important regional influences 
on note issuing.  
Controls for SIZE, AGE, and SIZExAGE are almost always significant and 
remain significant in the presence of regional indicator variables. NYC and URBAN 
enter negatively and most times significantly, becoming stronger across time. Those 
effects may also indicate an opportunity cost effect, since banks in cities may have had 
special lending opportunities that reduced their propensity to issue notes. 
Our results provide support for James’s (1978) view that the opportunity costs of 
lending varied across banks, and they explain the variation in the propensity to issue 
notes. Many banks (with low lending opportunity costs) were at a corner solution with 
respect to note issuing. Other banks (with high lending opportunity costs) issued less than 
the maximum permissible amount of notes.    33
We also explore variation over time in note issuance in Table 11. Here we pool 
the data for 1880, 1890, and 1900 into a single regression model, constraining the 
coefficients to be the same over time. To capture changes in the profitability of note 
issuing over time, in addition to our measures of opportunity costs from lending, we 
include the yield on government bonds as a regressor. We report two different versions of 
regressions that include the interest rate: one includes the current year’s interest rate 
(USCURR); the other includes the previous year’s interest rate (USLAG). Delays in 
issuing and redeeming notes suggest that using the previous year’s interest rate may be 
preferable (especially since innovations in long-term interest rates should not be 
predictable). For purposes of comparison, to see how much of the variation by year is 
captured by the interest rate, we also report a specification that includes annual indicator 
variables for each year. In order to include an interest rate in the regressions that is 
comparable over time, we had to adjust for differences in the maturity of government 
bonds to produce a constant-maturity U.S. government yield to maturity. Our procedure 
for doing so is explained in Appendix A. 
As discussed in Section V, the profitability of bond holding and note issuing 
(compared to deposit taking and lending) should be an increasing function of the yield on 
bonds. Table 11 reports that the sign on bond yields is positive and statistically 
significant. Remarkably, the specification that uses the previous year’s interest rate 
captures virtually all of the variation captured by the time dummies. That is, the 
improvement in log likelihood from adding the lagged interest rate is the same as the 
improvement from adding time dummies (an increase from -6956.4 to -6308.8). This   34
provides strong support for the view that variation in note issuance across banks and over 
time was strongly responsive to the relative profitability of note issuance. 
 
VII. Entry, Exit, and Bank Note Issuance 
The declining propensity to issue notes over time was reinforced by the exit of 
high note issuers and the entry of low note issuers. Furthermore, the tendency for banks 
in the MIDWEST, SOUTH, and WEST to issue fewer bank notes in 1880, 1890, and 
1900 was true of banks that survived the entire period, as well as those that entered 
between 1880 and 1900.  
Figure 10a illustrates that of the many national banks that entered the industry 
between 1880 and 1900, only 17% of those that entered (412 of 2,381 entering banks) 
chose a maximum note issue strategy, while a full 55% (1,312 of 2,381) chose to issue at 
the minimum. Furthermore, Figure 10b shows that 40% of those exiting the industry 
during the period (186 out of 470 exiting banks) were maximum issuers, while only 10% 
(46 of 470) were minimum issuers. Figure 7 illustrates that the majority of entry was in 
the MIDWEST, SOUTH, and WEST, where issuance was already low. Because entering 
banks predominantly issued at the minimum possible level, it appears (consistent with the 
discussion in section V) that those banks were interested in opportunities other than note 
issuance. Hence, despite 103% growth in the number of banks in the MIDWEST, 301% 
in the SOUTH, and 524% in the WEST, note issuance remained suppressed in those 
regions. 
Figure 10c illustrates that of banks that survived the period 1880-1900, 38% (577 
of 1,508) were minimum issuers and a roughly equal amount, 27% (400 of 1,508), were   35
maximum issuers. Figure 10d shows that among those surviving banks, 17% maintained 
a constant IPTRUNC (despite changes in the method for computing IP in 1882) and 63% 
reduced their IPTRUNC across the period (35% reduced issuance by 95% or more). 
Hence, only around 26% (395 banks) of banks that survived the period and 17% (412 
banks) of entering banks, for a total of 807 banks out of 3,861 in 1900, showed an interest 
in maximizing their note issuance in the period 1880-1900.  
The fact that exiting banks tended to rely more on note issuing than average and 
that entering banks focused less on note issuing than average while remaining banks 
reduced their issuance over our period provides further evidence that note issuing was not 
the primary profit center for national banks during our period. The regional patterns of 
entry and the fact that new entrants in the low-issuing regions were especially low note 
issuers corroborate the James (1978) hypothesis that opportunities other than note issuing 
were particularly high in those regions. 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
The long-standing puzzle of underissuance of national bank notes disappears 
when we disaggregate the data to the level of individual banks, take account of the limits 
banks faced on their maximum permissible note issues, and consider differences in 
opportunity costs of note issuing across banks. In 1880, 40% of national banks, in 1890, 
5% of national banks, and in 1900, 21% of national banks were maximum note issuers. 
Banks with low lending opportunities maximized their ability to issue notes but could not 
issue more than a certain amount. Other banks, with high lending opportunities, rationally 
chose not to issue more notes.   36
Models of redemption costs do not explain the substantial cross-sectional 
variation in the extent to which national banks chose to issue national bank notes. The 
theory that redemption risk explains underissuance of bank notes is inconsistent with the 
observed lack of any relationship between bank note issuance and excess reserve 
holdings.  
Furthermore, there seem to have been substantial economies of scope between 
note issuing, on the one hand, and deposit taking and lending, on the other hand. Those 
economies of scope probably included shared overhead costs as well as the ability to 
economize on the costs of maintaining mandatory minimum levels of reserves and capital 
when issuing notes. Combining deposit taking and note issuing allowed banks to make 
full use of capital and reserves that were legally required in support of note issuing but 
which exceeded warranted levels.  
National banks did not enter solely to issue national bank notes (what we call the 
pure “arbitrage” strategy). Once we take proper account of the regulatory limits on 
issuance and of the costs and benefits of entering purely to issue notes, that fact is not 
surprising.  Indeed, over the period 1880 to 1900, new entrants focused less on note 
issuing, while banks exiting were more likely to be maximum issuers. Note issuing was 
profitable only when combined with lending and deposit taking, and note issuing seems 
to have been a relatively unprofitable line of business for successful bankers. 
The puzzle of underissuance of national bank notes appears in large part to be an 
object lesson in the importance of disaggregating data and thus avoiding misleading 
“representative bank” analysis relating average bank behavior and average bank 
opportunities.    37
Appendix A 
 
This appendix explains the construction of a constant-maturity yield to maturity 
for U.S. government bonds for 1879, 1880, 1889, 1890, 1899, and 1900, which we 
employ in our regression analysis in Section VI.  Homer and Sylla (1991, pp. 310, 317 
and 343) is our source for redemption yields on government securities. The data we use 
from that source are as follows: 
 
Redemption Yields of U.S. Government Securities 
 
       6s of 1881  5s of 1891  4.5s of 1891  4s of 1907    4s of 1925 
 
1879         2.95       3.87          3.96         
1880               3.45                3.63         
1883               2.60      2.88          
1884               2.55      2.76          
1889                     1.04      2.13          
1890                2.37 
1899                2.22 
1900                  1.70          2.12 
 
Our procedure for constructing a constant-maturity yield for a 12-year 
government bond is as follows. First, we assume that the shape of the yield curve looking 
forward from two years is constant relative to the two-year yield. For example, we 
assume that the difference between the yield on a two-year (remaining maturity) 
government bond and a 12-year (remaining maturity) government bond is constant over 
time.  
When a 12-year (or 11-year) yield is observable in any of our six years for which 
we construct estimates, we use that number. Thus, in 1879 and 1880, the constant-
maturity yields are 3.87 and 3.45 percent, respectively. 
For the other years, we use all available information on term spreads to adjust the 
information we do have, under the assumption of constancy of term structure over time. 
Since we often have two or more such term spreads, and they need not imply the same 
constant-maturity yield, we average across estimates. For example, for 1889, we have 
three alternative estimates of the yield: (2.13-0.18=1.95); (2.13-0.09=2.04); 
(1.04+0.92=1.96). We average these three estimates to arrive at an estimate of 1.98%.  
Similarly, for 1890, we have two alternative estimates of yield: (2.37-0.18=2.19): (2.37-
0.09=2.28). We average these two estimates to arrive at an estimate of 2.24%. 
For 1899 and 1900, we have only an eight-year bond. In addition to the previous 
method, we also perform an interpolation, and our estimates for 1899 and 1900 represent 
an average of the observed spreads in earlier years and the interpolation method. 
Specifically, we average two estimates of a 12-year yield for 1899 to arrive at our 
estimate. First, we adjust the eight-year rate (2.22%) by adding 0.28 (from 1883) to arrive 
at a 24-year yield, then we subtract the average of the 0.09 and 0.18 spread (0.13) to 
convert that 24-year yield into a 12-year yield. This results in an estimate of 2.37%. 
Second, we linearly interpolate using the two 12-year term spreads from 1879, which   38
implies a term spread of 0.37 to be added to the 2.22% eight-year yield to convert it into a 
12-year yield of 2.59%. Averaging those two estimates results in our estimate of 2.48% 
for the 12-year yield in 1899. Following a similar method results in an estimated yield of 
1.97% in 1900. For 1900, we have an additional piece of information, which is the yield 
on the bond maturing in 1925 (2.12%). If we adjust that yield by subtracting 0.13 (the 
average of 0.09 and 0.18), we arrive at an estimate of 1.99%. Averaging across the three 
methods for 1900, we thus arrive at an estimate of 1.97%. 
 
Estimated Constant-Maturity (12-year) Yields to Maturity 
 
1879 1880 1889 1890 1899 1900 
3.87 3.45 1.98 2.24 2.48 1.97 
  
  Our conclusions are not very sensitive to the assumption of attaching equal 
weights to the various estimation approaches that underlie our final estimates of each 
number. Specifically, the consistency across the various estimation methods leads us to 
be reasonably confident that the true constant-maturity yields are not likely to be no more 
than 10 basis points different from our final estimates.   39
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 Figure 1: Histogram for Issue Propensity -- All Issuers, 1880





























































































sFigure 3: Histogram for Issue Propensity -- All Issuers, 1890

































































































sFigure 5: Histogram for Issue Propensity -- All Issuers, 1900















































































































sFigure 7: Distribution of Issuance (IPTRUNC) Across Decades and Regions
1880 1890 1900 1880-1890 1890-1900 1880-1900
NE 550 559 583 1.64 4.29 6.00
MA 616 939 780 52.44 -16.93 26.62
MW 660 1429 1343 116.52 -6.02 103.48
SO 90 415 361 361.11 -13.01 301.11
AP 124 243 207 95.97 -14.81 66.94
WE 38 202 237 431.58 17.33 523.68
































































































































































































































































































gFigure 8: The Financial Effects of Note Issue Arbitrage in 1880
Bonds to back 
Circulation
1,225 Notes 500




Assuming that government bonds earn 3.5% and taking into account the 1% tax on notes 
issued:
     Profits = 3.5% * 1,225 - 1% * 500
     Profits = 42.875 - 5.000
     Profits = 37.875
Dividing profits by capital and surplus yields:
     37.875 / (625 + 125) = 5.05% ROEFigure 9: The Financial Effects of Note Issue Arbitrage in 1880
Bonds to back 
Circulation
1,028 Notes 450




Assuming that government bonds earn 3.5% and taking into account the 1% tax on notes 
issued:
     Profits = 3.5% * 1,050 - 1% * 450
     Profits = 35.9625 - 4.500
     Profits = 31.4625
Dividing profits by capital and surplus yields:
     31.4625 / (499 + 100) = 5.24% ROEFigure 10a: 1900 IPTRUNC of Banks Entering 1880-1900 Figure 10b: 1880 IPTRUNC of Banks Exiting 1880-1900







































































































































































sFigure 11a: 1890 IPTRUNC of Banks Entering 1880-1890 Figure 11b: 1880 IPTRUNC of Banks Exiting 1880-1890











































































































































































sFigure 12a: 1900 IPTRUNC of Banks Entering 1890-1900 Figure 12b: 1890 IPTRUNC of Banks Exiting 1890-1900















































































































































































sTable 1: National Banking Laws Specifically Constraining Note Issue
Constraints on Maximum Note Issue:
1. If bank chartered before end of 1864, can issue up to 90% market value of bonds (not to exceed 90% of 
par if bonds pay greater than 5% interest), though not exceeding 100% capital (p. 340 Act of March 3, 
1863).
2. If bank chartered from beginning of 1865 to July 1870 (p. 364 Act of March 3, 1865):
• Banks with capital less than $500,000, can issue up to 90% capital;
• Banks with capital more than $500,000 and less than $1,000,000 can issue up to 80% capital;
• Banks with capital more than $1,000,000 and less than $3,000,000 can issue up to 75% capital;
• Banks with capital greater than $3,000,000 can issue up to 60% capital.
3. If bank chartered after 1870 then (p. 370 Act of July 12, 1870):
• No bank chartered after July 12, 1870 may issue more than $500,000 total.
     -- Banks with capital less than $500,000, can issue up to 90% capital (previous provision unaltered);
     -- Banks with capital more than $500,000 and less than $625,000 can issue up to 80% capital 
        (previous provision unaltered and 0.80*625,000=500,000);
4. After July 12, 1882, all banks may issue up to 90% of the par value of bonds backing the note issue, not 
exceeding 90% of capital. 
5. On March 14, 1900, the requirement was further relaxed to 100% of the par value of the bonds, not 
exceeding 100% of capital. 
State bank notes not yet redeemed subsequent to conversion count as national bank notes in calculations of 
maxima. 
Constraints on Minimum Note Issue:
1. Banks must hold bonds to back circulation amounting to the maximum of $30,000 or 33% of capital. 
Since banks must hold 111% of the notes in bonds to back the circulation, these note constraints mean that 
banks may issue minimum notes amounting to the greater of $30,000*(1/1.11)=$27,000 or 
33%*Capital*(1/1.11). 
2. After July 12, 1882, the minimum bond requirement was revised to 25% of capital for banks with capital 
less than $150,000.
Source: National Monetary Commission. Laws of the United States Concerning Money, Banking, and Loans, 
1778-1909. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1910. Senate Document 580, part 2, 61st 
Congress, 2nd session.Table 2: Variable Definintions
Variable Name Definition
IP (Actual Notes – Minimum Required Issuance) / (Maximum Permissible Notes – Minimum Required Issuance)
IPTRUNC IP trucated from above at 0.98 and from below at 0.02.
TER Amount due from the Treasury in Excess of the 5% Redemption Fund / Total Liabilities
NER    For central reserve cities: (Legal Tender Notes+Due from the Treasury in Excess of the 5% Redemption Fund-
0.25*Total Deposits) / Total Liabilities;
   For reserve cities: (Legal Tender Notes+Due from the Treasury in Excess of the 5% Redemption Fund-
0.125*Total Deposits) / Total Liabilities;
   For other cities: (Legal Tender Notes+Due from the Treasury in Excess of the 5% Redemption Fund-
0.06*Total Deposits) / Total Liabilities.
BER    For central reserve cities: (Legal Tender Notes+Due from the Treasury in Excess of the 5% Redemption Fund+
Due from Other Banks and Bankers-0.25*Total Deposits) / Total Liabilities;
   For other cities: (Legal Tender Notes+Due from the Treasury in Excess of the 5% Redemption Fund+
Due from Other Banks and Bankers-0.15*Total Deposits) / Total Liabilities.
NYC 1 if bank is located in New York City, 0 otherwise.
URBAN 1 if bank is located in Philadelphia, Boston, Chicago, New Orleans or San Francisco, 0 otherwise.
LNTA Natural log of Total Assets
AGE Number of years since treceiving a National Bank charter.
SIZEAGE LNTA * AGE
ROAL For 1880: State-level: (Net Income)/(Total Assets)-(0.0345-0.0100)*(Notes Outstanding)/(Total Assets)
For 1890: State-level: (Net Income)/(Total Assets)-(0.0224-0.0100)*(Notes Outstanding)/(Total Assets)
For 1900: State-level: (Net Income)/(Total Assets)-(0.0197-0.0100)*(Notes Outstanding)/(Total Assets)
LOANRAT Loans and Discounts/(Loans and Discounts+US Bonds on Hand+Other Stocks, Bonds, and Mortgages)
WDMK [(Total Capital in Manufacturingt-Total Capital in Manufacturingt-10)/Total Capital in Manufacturingt-10)]*
[Total Capital in Manufacturingt/(Total Capital in Manufacturingt+Total Capital in Agriculturet)]
WDFK [(Total Capital in Agriculturet-Total Capital in Agriculturet-10) / Total Capital in Agriculturet-10]*
[1-Total Capital in Manufacturingt/(Total Capital in Manufacturingt+Total Capital in Agriculturet)]
WROAM [(Value of Products in Manufacturing-Total Wages in Manufacturing-Total Cost of Materials in Manufacturing) / 
Total Capital in Manufacturing]*[Total Capital in Manufacturing/(Total Capital in Manufacturing+
Total Capital in Agriculture)]
TLTA Total Liabilities / Total Assets
LNTL Natural log of Total Liabilities
NTL Notes Outstanding / Total Liabilities
NTLSQ NTL squared.
USDTD US Deposits / Total Deposits
IBDTD Due to Other Banks / Total Deposits
RCITY    For 1880: 1 if bank is located in: Boston, Albany, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Baltimore, Washington, New Orleans, Louisville, 
Cincinnati, Cleveland, Chicago, Detroit,  Milwaukee, St. Louis, or San Francisco; 0 otherwise.
   For 1890: 1 if bank is located in: Boston, Albany, Philadelphia, Pittsburg, Baltimore, Washington, New Orleans, Louisville, 
Cincinnati, Cleveland, Detroit, Milwaukee,  Kansas City, St. Joseph, Omaha, or San Francisco; 0 otherwise.
   For 1900: 1 if bank is located in: Boston, Albany, Brooklyn, Philadelphia, Pittsburg, Baltimore, Washington, Savannah, New 
Orleans, Louisville, Houston, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Indianapolis, Detroit, Milwaukee,  Des Moines, St. Paul, 
Minneapolis, Kansas City, St. Joseph, Lincoln, Omaha, Denver, San Francisco, Los Angeles, or Portland; 0 otherwise.
CRCITY For 1880: 1 if bank is located in New York City; 0 otherwise.
For 1890 and 1900: 1 if bank is located in New York City, Chicago, or St. Louis; 0 otherwise.
NEWENGL 1 if bank is located in CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, or VT; 0 otherwise.
MIDATL 1 if bank is located in DE, NJ, NY, or PA; 0 otherwise.
MIDWEST 1 if bank is located in IL, IN, MI, OH, WI, IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, SD, ND, or DK (Dakota for 1880); 0 otherwise.
SOUTH 1 if bank is located in VA, AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, NC, SC, or TX; 0 otherwise.
APPALACH 1 if bank is located in KY, MD, TN, or WV; 0 otherwise.
WEST 1 if bank is located in CO, CA, OR, AZ, ID, MT, NV, NM, UT, WY, WA, AK, or HI; 0 otherwise.
NOTEOUT Bank notes outstanding.
USCURR Constant Maturity (12-year) Government Bond Yield to Maturity, Current Year (derived in Appendix A)
USLAG Constant Maturity (12-year) Government Bond Yield to Maturity, One Year Lagged Value (derived in Appendix A)Table 3: Summary Statistics
1880 1890 1900
Variable Name N Mean Median Std Error N Mean Median Std Error N Mean Median Std Error
IP 2090 0.7590 0.8571 0.0076 3540 0.0200 0.0000 0.0052 3861 0.2881 0.0667 0.0074
IPTRUNC 2090 0.7641 0.8571 0.0065 3540 0.1101 0.0200 0.0042 3861 0.3410 0.0667 0.0064
TER 2079 0.0012 0.0000 0.0001 3540 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 3860 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000
NER 2077 -0.0001 -0.0027 0.0011 3539 -0.0171 -0.0191 0.0008 3859 -0.0299 -0.0304 0.0005
BER 2077 0.0040 -0.0154 0.0020 3539 -0.0291 -0.0525 0.0017 3859 -0.0383 -0.0642 0.0016
NYC 2090 0.0225 0.0000 0.0032 3540 0.0133 0.0000 0.0019 3861 0.0114 0.0000 0.0017
URBAN 2090 0.0531 0.0000 0.0049 3540 0.0398 0.0000 0.0033 3861 0.0277 0.0000 0.0026
LNTA 2079 13.203 13.031 0.020 3540 13.017 12.850 0.017 3861 13.195 13.058 0.018
AGE 2090 12.396 15.000 0.103 3540 13.160 9.000 0.167 3861 18.990 17.000 0.198
SIZEAGE 2079 165.220 194.709 1.450 3540 175.599 123.663 2.286 3861 256.462 218.405 2.768
ROAL 2039 0.0168 0.0173 0.0002 3535 0.0247 0.0246 0.0001 3810 0.0182 0.0167 0.0001
LOANRAT 2090 0.9180 0.9685 0.0026 3540 0.9482 0.9906 0.0016 3861 0.8859 0.9417 0.0023
WDMK 1683 0.1322 0.0397 0.0141 2684 0.8510 0.2512 0.0670 3203 0.2776 0.1165 0.0139
WDFK 1683 0.0652 -0.0231 0.0169 2719 0.5777 0.0556 0.0663 3222 0.2542 0.0561 0.0127
WROAM 1702 0.1126 0.0550 0.0031 2894 0.0919 0.0483 0.0021 3247 0.1107 0.0760 0.0020
TLTA 2079 0.6388 0.6384 0.0022 3540 0.6237 0.6343 0.0020 3860 0.7192 0.7359 0.0018
LNTL 2079 12.7422 12.5699 0.0216 3540 12.5237 12.3798 0.0183 3860 12.8510 12.7264 0.0190
NTL 2079 0.3675 0.3449 0.0041 3540 0.1277 0.0994 0.0018 3860 0.1301 0.1000 0.0018
NTLSQ 2079 0.1698 0.1190 0.0035 3540 0.0282 0.0099 0.0010 3860 0.0292 0.0100 0.0009
USDTD 2088 6.69E-07 0.00E+00 6.42E-07 3539 2.87E-08 0.00E+00 5.96E-09 3860 2.96E-08 0.00E+00 6.26E-09
IBDTD 2088 0.0649 0.0157 0.0027 3539 0.0629 0.0199 0.0018 3860 0.0550 0.0091 0.0020
RCITY 2090 0.0914 0.0000 0.0063 3540 0.0664 0.0000 0.0042 3861 0.0785 0.0000 0.0043
CRCITY 2090 0.0225 0.0000 0.0032 3540 0.0201 0.0000 0.0024 3861 0.0158 0.0000 0.0020
NEWENGL 2090 0.2632 0.0000 0.0096 3540 0.1647 0.0000 0.0062 3861 0.1448 0.0000 0.0057
MIDATL 2090 0.2947 0.0000 0.0100 3540 0.2203 0.0000 0.0070 3861 0.2432 0.0000 0.0069
MIDWEST 2090 0.3158 0.0000 0.0102 3540 0.3794 0.0000 0.0082 3861 0.3701 0.0000 0.0078
SOUTH 2090 0.0431 0.0000 0.0044 3540 0.1020 0.0000 0.0051 3861 0.1075 0.0000 0.0050
APPALACH 2090 0.0593 0.0000 0.0052 3540 0.0585 0.0000 0.0039 3861 0.0629 0.0000 0.0039
WEST 2090 0.0182 0.0000 0.0029 3540 0.0669 0.0000 0.0042 3861 0.0523 0.0000 0.0036
NOTEOUT 2090 151,929 90,000 3,643 3540 34,747 22,500 695 3861 73,512 45,000 3,266
USCURR 2090 3.4500 3.4500 0.0000 3540 2.2400 2.2400 0.0000 3861 1.9700 1.9700 0.0000
USLAG 2090 3.8700 3.8700 0.0000 3540 1.9800 1.9800 0.0000 3861 2.4800 2.9000 0.0000Table 4: OLS Models of Excess Reserves, 1880, 1890, and 1900






































N 2,077 3,539 3,859 2,077 3,539 3,859
R-squared 0.003 0.006 0.010 0.511 0.471 0.448
Adj. R-squared -0.004 0.002 0.006 0.508 0.469 0.446
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Std. Error Std. Error Std. Error Std. Error Std. Error Std. Error
Intercept 0.0036 -0.0009 0.0018 0.1152 0.0706 0.0459
0.0038 0.0006 0.0008 0.0215 0.0132 0.0067
TLTA 0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0025 -0.0371 -0.0427 -0.0490
0.0024 0.0003 0.0006 0.0135 0.0068 0.0052
LNTL -0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0065 -0.0055 -0.0028
0.0002 0.0000 0.0001 0.0013 0.0009 0.0005
NTL -0.0005 0.0008 0.0006 -0.0247 -0.0367 0.0118
0.0032 0.0007 0.0011 0.0183 0.0164 0.0090
NTLSQ 0.0011 -0.0002 -0.0029 0.0289 0.0772 -0.0002
0.0034 0.0011 0.0022 0.0193 0.0254 0.0177
LOANRAT -0.0017 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0176 0.0010 -0.0044
0.0012 0.0003 0.0004 0.0067 0.0061 0.0030
USDTD -0.7970 -0.8484 -66.1297 3.7549 1,217 5,747
4.7200 71.0782 126.0965 26.7519 1,590 1,040
IBDTD -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0022 0.0031 0.0299
0.0014 0.0003 0.0005 0.0077 0.0065 0.0040
RCITY 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0379 -0.0441 -0.0411
0.0006 0.0001 0.0002 0.0033 0.0026 0.0018
CRCITY -0.0002 0.0000 0.0004 -0.1667 -0.1484 -0.1246
0.0011 0.0002 0.0004 0.0065 0.0046 0.0037
MIDATL 0.0002 0.0000 0.0001 0.0124 0.0100 0.0011
0.0004 0.0001 0.0002 0.0024 0.0019 0.0014
MIDWEST 0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 0.0351 0.0206 -0.0003
0.0004 0.0001 0.0002 0.0025 0.0018 0.0014
SOUTH 0.0009 0.0003 0.0005 0.0452 0.0428 0.0096
0.0008 0.0001 0.0002 0.0043 0.0024 0.0017
APPALACH -0.0005 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0255 0.0176 0.0004
0.0006 0.0001 0.0002 0.0037 0.0028 0.0019
WEST -0.0002 0.0000 0.0001 0.0186 0.0002 -0.0080





















N 2,077 3,539 3,859
R-squared 0.211 0.220 0.195
Adj. R-squared 0.206 0.217 0.192
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Std. Error Std. Error Std. Error
Intercept 0.4430 0.3175 0.3574
0.0490 0.0353 0.0243
TLTA -0.2492 -0.1438 -0.1851
0.0308 0.0183 0.0189
LNTL -0.0182 -0.0233 -0.0198
0.0029 0.0023 0.0019
NTL -0.2863 -0.4067 -0.3154
0.0418 0.0439 0.0325
NTLSQ 0.2307 0.8040 0.5568
0.0439 0.0681 0.0642
LOANRAT -0.0203 0.0141 -0.0200
0.0152 0.0164 0.0107
USDTD 2.0193 1,645 -1,592
60.9383 4,262 3,764
IBDTD 0.0367 0.1084 0.1476
0.0176 0.0175 0.0146
RCITY 0.0216 0.0429 0.0526
0.0076 0.0070 0.0064
CRCITY -0.0872 0.0049 0.0221
0.0147 0.0123 0.0134
MIDATL 0.0199 0.0224 0.0063
0.0054 0.0052 0.0050
MIDWEST 0.0593 0.0435 0.0224
0.0057 0.0049 0.0049
SOUTH 0.1031 0.1181 0.0681
0.0097 0.0064 0.0060
APPALACH 0.0534 0.0550 0.0358
0.0083 0.0074 0.0070
WEST 0.0908 0.0611 0.0519
0.0143 0.0073 0.0078Table 6: Marginal Effects from Reserves Models







































1880 1890 1900 1880 1890 1900 1880 1890 1900
Initial condition: 0.00110 0.00040 0.00047 -0.00612 -0.02692 -0.03061 0.00270 -0.07638 -0.05777
After $100,000 
increase in notes: 0.00109 0.00046 0.00036 -0.00918 -0.02955 -0.03159 -0.02212 -0.09176 -0.07399
Difference: 0.00000 0.00006 -0.00011 -0.00306 -0.00263 -0.00097 -0.02483 -0.01538 -0.01622Table 7: Examples of Issuers with Extreme of Arbitrage Possibilities in 1880
Ten banks with the lowest OTHASS (other assets/assets)
Bank Name City State ln(Size) Age IP2 OTHASS DEPASS IP (Raw)
Montpelier Montpelier VT 13.726 15 0.851 0.316 0.508 0.851
First Watertown NY 12.337 17 0.813 0.364 0.474 0.813
First Manchester NH 13.010 15 0.980 0.396 0.597 0.989
NB Middlebury VT 13.226 15 0.980 0.401 0.568 0.988
N Landholders' Kingston RI 12.395 15 0.971 0.412 0.485 0.971
N Whaling B New London CT 12.973 15 0.980 0.419 0.559 1.016
First Stonington CT 13.262 15 0.844 0.422 0.534 0.844
Fourth Pittsburgh PA 13.659 16 0.857 0.426 0.597 0.857
Washington Westerly RI 12.882 15 0.980 0.440 0.491 0.999
Vineland Vineland NJ 12.021 2 0.980 0.448 0.684 1.000
Ten banks with the lowest DEPASS (other debt/assets)
Bank Name City State ln(Size) Age IP2 OTHASS DEPASS IP (Raw)
First Pensacola FL 11.181 0 0.020 0.582 0.303 -1.500
Casco Portland ME 14.402 15 0.020 0.972 0.332 -0.488
Caledonia Danville VT 12.265 15 0.385 0.722 0.355 0.385
Roger Williams Providence RI 13.755 15 0.064 0.798 0.362 0.064
N Exchange Houston TX 12.100 7 0.025 0.805 0.365 0.025
American Providence RI 14.751 15 0.259 0.738 0.375 0.259
Commercial Providence RI 14.333 15 0.304 0.698 0.382 0.304
Phenix Phenix RI 12.059 15 0.387 0.652 0.398 0.387
Belvedere Belvedere NJ 13.407 15 0.028 0.850 0.398 0.028
N Warren B Warren RI 12.856 15 0.506 0.648 0.404 0.506Table 8: Tobit Models of Truncated Issue Propensity (IPTRUNC), 1880
(A) (B) (C)
Estimation Method Tobit Tobit Tobit






N 2,079 1,649 1,658
Log-likelihood -1647.7 -1305.6 -1287.8
Restricted Log-likelihood -1766.5 -1766.5 -1766.5
χ-squared 237.6 921.9 957.5
Significance (α) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Std. Error Std. Error Std. Error
Intercept -0.2787 -0.6483 -0.2292
0.6766 0.7677 0.7749
NYC -0.2715 -0.2821 -0.2812
0.0959 0.1011 0.1005
URBAN -0.0981 -0.0955 -0.1105
0.0615 0.0647 0.0646
SIZE 0.1089 0.1591 0.1323
0.0534 0.0599 0.0601
AGE 0.2201 0.2239 0.2180
0.0470 0.0526 0.0524




















Scale 0.5239 0.5207 0.5132
0.0121 0.0134 0.0132Table 9: Tobit Models of Truncated Issue Propensity (IPTRUNC), 1890
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Estimation Method Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit








N 3,540 2,681 2,681 2,719
Log-likelihood -1847.4 -1364.9 -1350.5 -1351.7
Restricted Log-likelihood -2087.6 -2087.6 -2087.6 -2087.6
χ-squared 480.5 1445.4 1474.3 1471.9
Significance (α) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Std. Error Std. Error Std. Error Std. Error
Intercept -1.3827 1.7525 1.2605 0.5658
0.8282 1.2285 1.2205 1.2265
NYC -0.0626 0.0531 -0.0544 0.4549
0.2950 0.3398 0.3377 0.3572
URBAN -1.0534 -1.2494 -1.2103 -0.6908
0.2619 0.3521 0.3395 0.3606
SIZE -0.0142 -0.0634 -0.0519 0.0291
0.0652 0.0904 0.0895 0.0922
AGE 0.3071 0.3016 0.3229 0.2924
0.0460 0.0628 0.0630 0.0619
SIZEAGE -0.0202 -0.0197 -0.0216 -0.0194
0.0035 0.0048 0.0048 0.0047
MIDATL 0.2612 0.2787 0.0823
0.0828 0.1141 0.1228
MIDWEST -0.3100 -0.2052 -0.4254
0.0838 0.1180 0.1308
SOUTH -0.3011 -0.3526 -0.4377
0.1305 0.1973 0.1937
APPALACH -0.2688 -0.1471 -0.3090
0.1393 0.1778 0.1830
WEST -0.6095 -0.3553 -0.6142
0.1764 0.3107 0.3061
ROAL -20.9815 -9.8059 -12.0428
6.4864 6.6455 6.5606
LOANRAT -2.3235 -2.1370 -2.0061
0.3639 0.3591 0.3529






Scale 1.1459 1.2558 1.2376 1.2207
0.0443 0.0595 0.0585 0.0574Table 10: Tobit Models of Truncated Issue Propensity (IPTRUNC), 1900
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Estimation Method Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit








N 3,861 3,203 3,203 3,222
Log-likelihood -3950.1 -3287.2 -3260.9 -3256.2
Restricted Log-likelihood -4122.4 -4122.4 -4122.4 -4122.4
χ-squared 344.7 1670.4 1723.2 1732.6
Significance (α) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Std. Error Std. Error Std. Error Std. Error
Intercept -5.4545 -4.2189 -4.6769 -5.2917
0.4752 0.5643 0.5727 0.5858
NYC -0.4443 -0.1878 -0.3377 -0.1151
0.2152 0.2223 0.2237 0.2262
URBAN -0.8828 -0.8242 -0.8698 -0.6633
0.1457 0.1556 0.1555 0.1593
SIZE 0.4081 0.3844 0.4130 0.4848
0.0369 0.0416 0.0417 0.0442
AGE 0.2121 0.2156 0.2261 0.2133
0.0209 0.0242 0.0241 0.0240
SIZEAGE -0.0152 -0.0155 -0.0165 -0.0157
0.0016 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018
MIDATL 0.1563 0.1430 0.0373
0.0668 0.0841 0.0858
MIDWEST -0.1540 -0.1252 -0.2833
0.0641 0.0836 0.0891
SOUTH -0.2418 -0.2011 -0.3305
0.0878 0.1150 0.1169
APPALACH 0.1016 0.1990 0.0882
0.0975 0.1113 0.1126
WEST -0.5126 -0.5895 -0.7500
0.1127 0.1353 0.1370
ROAL -6.6085 -5.6572 -6.7638
3.0832 3.5910 3.5654
LOANRAT -0.9292 -0.7657 -0.7449
0.1634 0.1697 0.1685






Scale 1.1355 1.1393 1.1266 1.1177
0.0276 0.0304 0.0301 0.0298Table 11: Tobit Model of Truncated Issue Propensity (IPTRUNC), All Years Pooled
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Estimation Method Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit








N 7,533 7,533 7,533 7,533
Log-likelihood -6956.4 -6543.6 -6308.8 -6308.8
Restricted Log-likelihood -10136.5 -10136.5 -10136.5 -10136.5
χ-squared 6360.1 7185.7 7655.3 7655.3
Significance (α) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Intercept -1.3223 -4.1584 -4.0312 -1.2345
0.3879 0.3731 0.3573 0.3446
NYC -0.7898 -0.4557 -0.4475 -0.4464
0.1253 0.1146 0.1123 0.1124
URBAN -0.6792 -0.5715 -0.5645 -0.5642
0.0825 0.0763 0.0750 0.0750
SIZE 0.1845 0.1060 0.1460 0.1454
0.0284 0.0260 0.0251 0.0253
AGE 0.1733 0.1440 0.1705 0.1702
0.0184 0.0167 0.0162 0.0163
SIZEAGE -0.0123 -0.0094 -0.0120 -0.0119
0.0014 0.0013 0.0012 0.0012
MIDATL -0.1052 0.1691 0.1014 0.1029
0.0472 0.0443 0.0427 0.0434
MIDWEST -0.1936 0.0137 -0.1127 -0.1110
0.0463 0.0430 0.0416 0.0425
SOUTH 0.0867 -0.1060 -0.2503 -0.2499
0.0738 0.0670 0.0665 0.0665
APPALACH 0.1565 0.2246 0.1162 0.1173
0.0695 0.0642 0.0627 0.0629
WEST -0.2541 -0.1457 -0.3881 -0.3858
0.0976 0.0887 0.0872 0.0880
ROAL -0.4693 0.0576 -0.0171 -0.0146
0.0152 0.0208 0.0165 0.0206
LOANRAT -1.4143 -1.1999 -0.7981 -0.8002
0.1196 0.1089 0.1059 0.1064
WDFK -0.1155 -0.0584 -0.0247 -0.0747
0.0163 0.0143 0.0125 0.0218
WDMK -0.1425 -0.0854 -0.0749 -0.0248









Scale 1.0637 0.9648 0.9317 0.9315
0.0189 0.0170 0.0163 0.0164